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Is All Discourse Official? On the
Poetics of Gifting and Gossiping
Pierre-Héli Monot
For it is characteristic of symbols that they are never entirely arbitrary.
Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics 79
[The guest] finds no welcome, no lodging and no guarantee except in the house of
the man with whom he is connected by philótēs [affection]. This bond is given visible
expression in the súmbolon, the sign of recognition, which has the form of a broken
ring, the matching halves of which were kept by the parties to the relationship.
Émile Benveniste, Indo-European Language and Society 278
 
1. Two Roads Diverged
1 After  fifty  long  years  of  triumphant,  authoritarian1 liberalism  in  the  academic,
economic,  and  political  fields,  one  may  understandably  be  tempted  to  follow  the
venerable  doctrine  of  Socialist  orators  of  the  late  nineteenth  century:  quote  your
opponents sparingly. To a certain extent, this short essay demonstrates the difficulty of
doing so. At times, the literary humanities resemble a culturalist, somewhat Byzantine
version of authoritarian liberalism which, in turn, has given birth to several of  the
distinctive  features  of  the  contemporary  university.  The  production  of  industrial
quantities  of  academic  commentary  across  disciplines,  for  one,  as  well  as  the
dissociation  from  historical  reality  such  an overproduction  sometimes  entails  (and
sometimes intends to consolidate), are both typical of the current formation of Western
governance  and  one  of  its  main  structural  necessities.  As  an  academic  style,  this
culturalist imaginary has its own string of familiar rituals—its Schumpeterian ethos of
“creative destruction,”2 its phraseology, its Foucauldian themes, its historical Adamism
(and Adam Smithism). 
2 In what follows, I will discuss gift-giving and gossiping in a canonical American novel
(John Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath, 1939) by way of the two texts which, for reasons I
will  try to make clear,  sealed the fate of  dominant literary scholarship after WWII:
Marcel Mauss’s essay The Gift3 (1924/1925) and Claude Lévi-Strauss’s Introduction to the
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Work  of  Marcel  Mauss4 (1950).  I  argue  that  Steinbeck’s  use  of  nominally  non-official
discourse—such  as  hearsay,  rumor,  and  gossip—outlines  a  threefold  critique  of
capitalism, official discourse, and academic literary criticism. Gossiping is an example
of non-capitalist gift-economy which depends on mutuality, trust, and anonymity. In
turn, mutuality, trust, and anonymity outline a kind of literary criticism which would
disrupt neither the value of informal discourse (hear-say, rumor, and gossip) for the
disenfranchised, nor the value of gifting as a practical, non-capitalist economy. I use
“official” in its etymological sense: “appropriate for service or ceremony,” “required by
duty.” I argue that while gossip and rumor are types of informal discourse, they are
simultaneously  types  of  official discourse,  despite  their  colloquial  uses  and
connotations:  they engage the fundamental  moral  categories of  the disenfranchised
and the power structures that seal their economic and political fate, and they do so in
the form of recurring, defined social practices.
3 In  The  Gift,  Mauss  essentially  provides  a  model  for  what  could  have  been  some  of
modern literary theory’s greatest arguments in support of its political and educational
value as an academic discipline. In his commentary on Mauss, on the other hand, Lévi-
Strauss introduces what has become modern literary theory’s inexhaustible wellspring
of  political  licitness,  namely,  the idea that  literature and its  academic study are  a)
deprived of clearly defined referents b) the discursive extensions of market paradigms.
Lévi-Strauss also introduces several of the perennial entries in the discipline’s critical
lexicon (“floating signifier” for instance; for what it is worth, my search engine lists
about  7,000  hits  for  the  term  on  pages  and  files  published  online  in  2020  alone).
Whatever the status Marcel Mauss’s classic essay has in neighboring disciplines, I know
of not one work of literary theory in which The Gift is discussed in terms other than those
proposed by Lévi-Strauss or by those among Lévi-Strauss’s readers who came to define
the gilded age of literary theory from the mid-20th century onwards (Jacques Derrida,
Jacques Lacan, Jean Baudrillard, such proponents of mid-century mysticism as Georges
Bataille and Maurice Blanchot, as well as a host of minor Lévi-Straussians). 
4 The  opaque  critical  shroud  surrounding  The  Gift is  interesting  in  itself,  for  Lévi-
Strauss’s Introduction,  despite its signal importance for Lévi-Strauss’s own work, has
long been disparaged as, precisely, an introduction to Marcel Mauss, especially by those
who count themselves as followers of Mauss’s socialist and anti-utilitarian conception
of  the  social  sciences.  Cloaked in  Lévi-Strauss’s  own scientist  anthropology  of  gift-
giving societies, some of Mauss’s most profound and also most polemical insights were
emptied of their utopian content. Born out of his complementary involvement with
ethnology, socialist activism and cooperativism between 1920 and 1925 (Dzimira 2007),
The Gift was admitted to literary theory’s pantheon of unread classics under the tacit
condition that it be stripped of its originary relationship with that other “total social
fact,” international socialism.5 
5 I return to Mauss by way of Lévi-Strauss in order to pursue two distinct lines of inquiry,
hoping  they  will  be  mutually  enlightening.  The  first  line  strips  away  a  layer  of
theoretical  discourse  from  a  primary  text  which  has  continued  to  grow  in  stature
among activists and non-academic readers. I discuss Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath in
order  to  show  that  such  a  revision  is  productive  for  the  humanities  and  that  it
foregrounds some of the fundamental features of this canonical text. The second line of
inquiry, which I pursue much more loosely, and also somewhat more polemically, tries
to understand why and how this supplementary layer of critical discourse served as an
Is All Discourse Official? On the Poetics of Gifting and Gossiping
European journal of American studies, 15-4 | 2020
2
ideological  lubricant which made some of  Mauss’s  essential  theses amenable to the
needs  of  the  emerging  neoliberal-capitalist  university.  I  want  to  show  what  the
intercession  of  Lévi-Strauss’s  concepts  between  Mauss  and  several  generations  of
literary scholars made possible in the context of the great transformations of the past
half century. I propose, in other words, a utilitarian, teleological reading of one of the
founding documents of anti-utilitarianism. 
 
2. Giving, Receiving, Returning
6 Several  anarchist  and,  to  a  lesser  degree,  socialist  traditions  have  long  sought  to
explain discourses that are nominally non-official and effectively informal, such as hear-
say, rumor, and gossip, in terms of their usefulness as weapons of resistance to social
domination. These weapons are taken to be symbolic: they enable the vulnerable to
express their opposition to social domination and exploitation while affording them
the anonymity and security necessary to do so. Hearsay, rumor, and gossip, because
they are treated as authorless forms of political discourse, enable vulnerable political
actors to participate in the contestation of a political order without having to endanger
their  natural  personhood.  Non-official  discourse  is  hence  efficient  when  it  both
successfully  undermines  a  contested  political  order  and shields  vulnerable  political
actors from the probable negative consequences of their political engagement (Scott
278-279). 
7 In  practical  terms,  or  in  terms  of  practical  political  strategy,  the  weakness  of  this
conception  lies  in  the  fact that  any  participant  who  relays  non-official,  authorless
discourse on to the next participant may retroactively be designated as its author, even
though he or she has merely acted as an intermediary. From the moment non-official
discourse circulates widely in a communicative setting (or goes “viral”), the security it
affords is dependent on trust: non-official discourse must be passed on to those only
who can be reasonably expected to treat it as such and guarantee the anonymity of
their sources (that is, in effect, of all other intermediaries). The more vulnerable the
giver, the riskier the act of relaying gossip and thus the higher the value of trust in the
decision  either  to  give  or  not  to  give  information  on  to  the  next  intermediary.6
However, in order to understand how trust functions as a condition of possibility in the
propagation of non-official discourse, the more so in situations of social vulnerability in
which trust is necessary but hard to guarantee, it is helpful to draw on a paradigm
which has attributed considerable importance to trust, mutuality, and responsibility in
the circulation of material  and symbolic goods:  Marcel Mauss’s theorization of gift-
giving practices.
8 In the opening sentence of The Gift,  Mauss indicates that he draws on more than a
century of ethnographic research, which had long considered gift-giving as a favored
theme.  Mauss  was  not  greatly  innovative  in  his  choice  of  subject  matter.  His
groundbreaking innovation resided in two more or less implicit, at times antithetical
questions he sought to answer jointly in the course of his essay. The first concerns
gifting  as  such:  Can  the  pattern  of  giving,  receiving,  and  repaying  gifts  which
ethnographers had observed in the Pacific  Islands be considered to be universal  or
universalizable  (and  if  not,  why  not)?  The  second  question,  which  Mauss  raises
insistently, but almost always implicitly, concerns anthropological methodology: Can a
thesis (for instance: “something about gifting is universal”) be phrased in such a way as
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to make sense for the societies it describes (e.g. the indigenous peoples of the Pacific
Northwest) and for the society this same thesis is addressed to (e.g. the French Third
Republic)? Taken as a whole, these two questions raise a third one, which is synthetic:
Is  there a  similarity  between the exchange of  material  gifts  (commodities)  and the
exchange of ideas (symbolic goods)? Or, to put it differently: What are the conditions
under which ideas may circulate like gifts? This, at least, is the logic implied in Mauss’s
two introductory questions: “What rule of legality and self-interest, in societies of a backward
or archaic type, compels the gift that has been received to be obligatorily reciprocated? What
power  resides  in  the  object  given  that  causes  its  recipient  to  pay  it  back?”  (4,  italics  in
original). The first sentence phrases Mauss’s question in terms familiar to scholars of
the  French  Third  Republic:  Mauss  invokes  a  legally  literate,  progressive  homo
oeconomicus who is exclusively devoted to the pursuit of his or her self-interest. The
second sentence phrases the same question in terms wholly inadmissible to these same
scholars;  in  the  French  Third  Republic,  no  compelling  power  resides  “in”  objects,
although Mauss suggests that this may well be the case in “archaic” societies. In other
words, he presents a classic7,  yet very early formulation of a crucial methodological
problem in the social sciences: How can theorization avoid attributing to its object such
properties that, in fact, belong to the instruments of theorization itself? Mauss eludes
the answer by presenting two incompatible formulations of the same problem: one is
nominally rational-scientific, the other nominally pre-theoretical and indigenous.
9 Lévi-Strauss’s Introduction has done much to cement the notion that Mauss had fallen
prey  to  “magical  or affective  notions”  (Lévi-Strauss  49)  and  that  the  “power”  that
resides in objects given and received—a power Mass called the “hau”—was Mauss’s own
desperate attempt at a rationalization of theoretical contradictions that had arisen in
the course of his research:
In this essay, Mauss seems—rightly—to be controlled by a logical certainty, namely,
that  exchange  is  the  common  denominator  of  a  large  number  of  apparently
heterogeneous social activities. But exchange is not something he can perceive on
the level of the facts. Empirical observation finds not exchange, but only, as Mauss
himself says, ‘three obligations: giving, receiving, returning.’ So the whole theory
calls  for  the existence of  a  structure,  only fragments of  which are delivered by
experience—just  its  scattered  members,  or  rather  its  elements.  If  exchange  is
necessary,  but not given, then it  must be constructed. How? By applying to the
isolated parts which are the only present elements, a source of energy which can
synthesize them. (Lévi-Strauss 45-46)
10 Because in Lévi-Strauss’s account Mauss knew that indigenous peoples did not have a
general (or even “structural”) understanding of the practice of gift-giving and that they
mystified the effective obligation to return gifts as a series of isolated acts of generosity,
he had to “add to the mixture an additional quantity which gives him the illusion of
squaring his account. This quantity is hau” (47). Lévi-Strauss then explains that hau can
“obviously not” (46) be a physical property of the exchanged goods, and that we hence
find ourselves faced with an alternative: either the property [hau] is nothing other
than the act of exchange itself as represented in indigenous thinking, in which case
we are going round in a circle, or else it is a power of a different nature, in which
case the  act  of  exchange  becomes,  in  relation  to  this  power,  a  secondary
phenomenon.
The only way to avoid the dilemma would have been to perceive that the primary,
fundamental  phenomenon  is  exchange  itself,  which  gets  split  up  into discrete
operations in social life; the mistake was to take the discrete operations for the
basic phenomenon (47).
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11 Whether Mauss’s translation of hau as “power” is adequate is entirely beside the point
here8, yet Lévi-Strauss’s crucial operation of subsuming “the three obligations: giving,
receiving, returning” under the general phenomenon of “exchange” (45) has two major
consequences.  Firstly,  it  strips  gift-giving  practices  of  their  subjective  ethical  and
epistemological dimensions,  and  empties  the  discrete  acts  of  “giving,  receiving,
returning”  of  the  contingent  moral,  phronetic  operations  that  make  them possible
(such as assessing whether someone can be trusted with returning a gift, or assessing
whether he will be able and willing to accept it in the first place, given the fact that he
will be expected to return a gift of an at least equal value, etc.). Secondly, Lévi-Strauss
replaces  what  we  may  call  Mauss’s  reasonable  choice  competitors with  rational  choice
individualists and naturalizes  a  market  paradigm in the place  of  a  non-rationalistic,
albeit competitive gift-economy system.9 
12 This last point can briefly be explained by using the example of a simplified prisoner’s
dilemma situation.10 In a theoretical setting where two participants can either “split” or
“steal” a payoff with the result of either a) an equal division of the payoff in the case of
both participants “splitting” or b) a single winner of the total payoff in the case of one
of the participants “stealing” and the other “splitting” or c) no payoff at all in the case
of both participants “stealing,” no single choice (each of the actors either “splitting” or
“stealing”) maximizes the chance of winning either a part or the whole of the payoff;
all options are “rationally” equal, and equally uncertain: participants have no reason to
assume that their opponent will  want to avoid a double “steal,” nor have they any
reason to maximize the chance of a “split.” “Splitting” is not incentivized. This is true
both as an axiom in game-theory and in a socio-economic theory (that is, in capitalism
as  an  economic  and  anthropological  model)  in  which  all  homines  oeconomici are
expected to choose the option that maximizes their own individual utility; as no single
choice is  rationally  superior to any other,  the value of  self-interested rationality is
paradoxically nil in this specific situation11. This is not true, however, in the context of
a  Maussian  society.  Here,  ostensible  self-interest  is  tabooed.  In  this  situation,  both
actors stand under the social obligation to attribute to one another a propensity to act
generously. In this situation, it is reasonable and socially expected to attribute to one
another the willingness to “split” and to behave accordingly, be it in a game setting or
in actual gifting situations. It is precisely because all participants expect all others not
to behave as  rational-choice individualists  that  the situation in which there are no
winners  at  all  can  be  avoided.  The  social  imaginary  of  gift-giving  societies  hence
maximizes  the  chances  of  winning the  payoff  both individually  (always  half  of  the
payoff as long as the taboo of self-interest is upheld) and collectively (always all of the
payoff as long as the taboo of self-interest is upheld); such a social imaginary, including
its structuring taboo, effectively has the same outcomes as other schemes prevalent in
game theory and economics, notably superrationality (in which an actor assumes that he
and all other actors have perfect rationality and will hence cooperate and mutualize
the payoff; in fact, as long as the taboo is strictly upheld and known to all participants,
attributing generosity to all other actors is a superrational position). 12 The fact that
“generosity” is also profitable for all actors involved and that it hence maximizes the
utility of generosity for the community (as it guarantees that the total payoff will be won,
even  though  it  is  shared  among  two  participants)  invalidates  neither  the  model’s
consistency nor its ethical import. After all, the egoistical pursuit of material interests
by  rational  economic  actors  was  believed  to  profit  not  only  individuals,  but  the
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capitalist community too13—yet, beyond the added benefit of a more equal distribution
of the payoff among participants, only a Maussian model ensures that a payoff is won at
all. In such a model, the ritualistic opposition of egoism and altruism is suspended as
long as the community upholds the threefold injunction to give,  to receive,  and to
return, as well as its moral adjunct: the tabooing of ostensible self-interest.14 
13 To  conclude  this  first  reading,  let  us  briefly  take  up  again  Mauss’s  two  mutually
exclusive formulations of the obligation to reciprocate gifts as both a “rule of legality
and self-interest” and a power that “resides in objects” (Mauss 4). While Lévi-Strauss
deduces a generalized economic market (“exchange”) from the need “for the existence
of a structure,” a market deduced, in other words, from the need for a “theory” (Lévi-
Strauss  45-46),  one  may  reverse  the  proposition  and  retort  conversely  and
simultaneously—and for  the  sake  of  methodological  reflexivity  only—that  any need
“for the existence of a structure” or a “theory” may equally well be the result of a
generalized economic market.  In other words,  if  the need for theoretical coherence
leads to the discovery of a “market” in the place of the three obligations of “giving,
receiving, returning,” one may wish to question the relationship such theorizations
have to the market in the first place and, hypothetically, dispense with both, as the
population studied by Mauss quite apparently did. This, it seems to me, is precisely the
sense of Mauss’s contradictory introductory questions; his seemingly “mystified” belief
in  the  existence  of  a  “hau”  is,  in  fact,  an  economic  and methodological  argument,
rather than an anthropological one: the indigenous concept of “hau” is not only an
occasion for a theoretical description, but also for a simultaneous materialist critique of
this (and possibly every) act of theorization itself. There should indeed be no reason to
take both of Mauss’s questions other than at face value, and in fact they are both true at
the same time as long as we read Mauss’s essay as a radical experiment in ethnological
reflexivity. Both the “self-interest” thesis and the “power in objects” thesis can be true
simultaneously:  for  this,  we  must  admit  that  Mauss  was  willing  to  refrain  from
theorizing  social  actions  if  and  when  this  theorization  simultaneously  led  to  the
introduction  of  a  capitalist  paradigm  in  place  of  the  gift-giving  practices  he  had
observed.
14 Hence, a thesis (for instance: “something about gifting is universal”) can be phrased in
such a way as to make sense of the societies it describes (the indigenous peoples of the
Pacific Northwest) and make sense for the society this same thesis is addressed to (the
French Third Republic). To do so, Mauss points to the fact that the capitalist economy
and gift-giving practices are not mutually exclusive. In fact, both capitalist exploitation
and gift-giving may coexist in one and the same social setting. 
 
3. A Maussian Theory of Gossip
15 This  superposition,15 rather  than  mere  opposition  of  competing  economic  systems,
seems to me to be an essential feature of literary discourse, or at least of a significant
portion of it—a blanket statement which has to be licit in a discipline which, after all,
has never been able to function without instituting some kind of grand interpretative
scheme (floating signifiers, dialogism, rhizomes and the like). I wish to argue in the
following that the inclusion of informal discourse such as hear-say, rumor, and gossip
in novelistic  discourse fundamentally alters the way we should go about producing
commentary on literature. The Grapes of Wrath is, understandably, a prime exhibit piece
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for this argument, as the novel is teeming with informal discourse: to put it somewhat
bluntly, the novel is about migrants whispering to one another—and to one another
only—where to find food, a job, a shelter, and a community; to put it even more bluntly,
this  is  a  novel  about  migrants  whispering  to  one  another  how  to  identify  other
migrants, and how to survive together. 
16 In  its  eponymous  second  chapter,  The  Grapes  of  Wrath outlines  the  migrants’  own
conception of the Maussian “power in objects” and, in passing, declares that capitalism,
rather than gift-giving, is derived from “indigenous” thinking:
The driver said,  ‘Fellow was telling me the bank gets orders from the East.  The
orders were, “Make the land show profit or we’ll close you up.”’
‘But where does it stop? Who can we shoot? I don’t aim to starve to death before I
kill a man that’s starving me.’
‘I  don’t know. Maybe there’s nobody to shoot. Maybe the thing isn’t men at all.
Maybe, like I said, the property’s doing it. Anyway I told you my orders.’ (Steinbeck 250,
my italics)
17 Capitalist exploitation has its own familiar train of “mystifications”: fetishized property
—property which is abstracted from its conditions of production and use—informs the
migrant’s most concrete experience of what we take to be actors in “a market,” in other
words,  what  economic  agency  is.  The  novel  describes  how  the  migrants  end  up
producing a critique of fetishized capital (capitalism’s own hau) and become able to
identify individuals, rather than “things,” as the source of power and domination—the
“owners” (219). Simultaneously, the novel describes an alternative economy, in which
the identification and naming of individual gifters and gossipers is tabooed—although,
again, the term economy is not quite suited here, as the migrants do not perceive the
discrete acts  of  giving,  receiving,  and returning as moments in a  series  that  would
make up a formal market or economic system (as, more generally, “Merchandising was
a secret  to  them” [313]).  Indeed,  the novel  depicts  how the migrants  establish and
maintain  a  relatively  informal  system  of  “marketless”  gift-giving  practices.  The
migrants give, receive, and return commodities and, most importantly, symbolic goods:
gossip, reliable and unreliable information, opinions, warnings, interpretations of their
socio-economic situation, hypotheses as to how to reclaim a livelihood and a dignity.
We are hence faced with a situation which reverses Lévi-Strauss’s comments on Mauss:
the “market,” rather than the gift-giving paradigm, is dependent on a mystification
(attributing  power  to  commodities, rather  than  to  those  who  profit  from  their
production, expropriation, and commercialization).
18 In  fact,  Steinbeck  outlines  innumerable  situations  in  which  informal  discourse
functions as a standard case of gift-giving. These examples of “gossiping as gifting”
never coalesce into a theory; yet if the migrants are perceived by local populations as
“degenerates”  precisely  because  they have “no sense of  property  rights”  (510),  the
novel  nevertheless  sketches  out  a  very  complex  system of  tacit  rules  under  which
commodities and information may circulate. Most significantly, rumors about available
jobs structure the plot and map out a possible trail for the migrants: “In the camps the
word would come whispering, There’s work at Shafter. And the cars would be loaded in
the night, the highways crowded” (460). The migrants assess whether gossip can be
trusted (“They said that? Seem like a fella that knowed? Not jus’ blowin’ off?” [313])
and whether gossip can be trusted as gossip, that is, as a discourse predicated on trust,
anonymity,  and  the  effective  existence  of  a  community  among  which  informal
discourse  may  circulate  safely.  This  includes  various  heuristics  for  weighing  the
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trustworthiness  of  local  belonging  against  the  trustworthiness  of  a  common socio-
economic situation16 (do we share “almost a kin bond” [387] because we are dependent
on trusting one another?). Assessing whether and how one belongs to a communicative
situation  in  which  the  truthfulness of  discourse  is  inextricably  tied  up  with  the
trustworthiness of those on which its transmission depends.
19 In  the  novel,  gifting  and  gossiping  are  never  made  explicit  as  binding  norms  of
reciprocity. Charity is tabooed by the migrants (“it makes a burn that don’t come out”
[546])  in  the same terms and for  the  same reasons  as  Mauss  does:  “Charity  is  still
wounding for him who has accepted it” (Mauss 83). The ability to forget that one has
received symbolic or material gifts is necessary for the upholding of shared community
practices: returning a piece of information after a sufficient lapse of time can, in turn,
be perceived as an isolated act of generosity and as a common commitment against
self-interest, whereas charity (“if you ever took it, you don’t forget it”17) institutes a
system of obligatory and above all explicit reciprocity. For the migrants in Steinbeck’s
novel, the obligation of reciprocation must imperatively remain tacit and cloaked in
the  garb  of  generosity;  a  single  exception  in  the  course  of  the  novel  makes  the
obligation explicit, yet only to better reaffirm the taboo:
‘We’re proud to help,’ said Wilson.
‘We’re beholden to you,’ said Pa.
‘There’s no beholden in a time of dying,’ said Wilson, and Sairy echoed him, ‘Never
no beholden.’
Al said, ‘I’ll fix your car–me an’ Tom will.’ And Al looked proud that he could return
the family’s obligation.
‘We could use some help.’ Wilson admitted the retiring of the obligation. (357)
20 The  surplus-value  created  by  the  tabooed  obligation  to  reciprocate  material  and
symbolic gifting is the effective survival of the gifting community itself: gossiping and
gifting are necessary in order to uphold the efficient fiction of spontaneous generosity
and to prohibit self-interested behavior within the migrant community.
21 On the  narratological  level,  the  sixteen intercalary  chapters  in  The  Grapes  of  Wrath
imply  an  alternative  economy  of  symbolic  and  material  gifting,  receiving,  and
returning which is juxtaposed with the remainder of Steinbeck’s more conventional
plot-driven chapters. The intercalary chapters revolve around generalized characters
and  voices,  and  wholly  reject  free  indirect  discourse:  there  simply  is  no  narrative
mediation  of  the  direct  speech  of  characters.  As  such,  these  intercalary  chapters
assemble  authorless,  anonymous  statements  that  are  presented  as  having  long
circulated among the migrants  and which now make up the content  of  a  symbolic
transaction between the diegetic reality and the reader. We may think of this symbolic
transaction  as  the  general  form  of  a  particular  case,  a  seldom  commented  ritual
opposition  which  structures  The  Grapes  of  Wrath,  and  we  can  do  so  in  order  to
understand how such a symbolic transaction might be apprehended as a problem for
literary criticism. Indeed, orality is contrasted with writing throughout the novel: the
Joads repeatedly express how writing is tied up with the experience of dispossession
and humiliation (“[Pa] don’t even like word writin’. Kinda scares ’im, I guess. Ever’ time
Pa seen writin’, somebody took somepin away from ’im.” [266]), while orality remains
the exclusive medium of gossiping and symbolic gifting. Orality is, significantly, also
the vector  of  religious discourse.  During a  dialogue on the political  implications of
gaining  literacy,  the  preacher  Jim Casy  insists  that  spoken words  become equal  to
gifted commodities and are seamlessly integrated into a network of reciprocal acts of
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generosity: “I never took no collections when I was preachin’ out here to folks… I took a
pair of pants when mine was wore out, an’ a ol’ pair a shoes when I was walkin’ through
to the groun’” [268]. Gossiping and gifting both belong in the same informal system of
“marketless” gift-giving practices;  words and commodities are nominally equivalent
and mutually  exchangeable,  yet only  as  long  as  the  community  which  makes  such
exchanges possible is maintained.18
22 By contrast, the “han’bills” advertising work, and more generally writing in general, are
inflationary: they are inflationary because they originate from outside the marketless
society established by the migrants, they are inflationary because their unreliability (or
their  reliability  as  deceitful  discourse)  generates  multiple,  equally  inadequate
interpretations,  and  they  are  inflationary  because  they  superimpose  a  generalized
market paradigm and the generation of capital on a marketless system which depends
on trust and the survival of a community. The duplicity of hand-bills can be turned into
capital: it is precisely because the written word is not worth anything, because it cannot
be trusted19, and thus cannot be reliably exchanged against essential commodities (food
and shelter), that writing can generate capital. 
23 Let us finally return to Mauss’s speculative question: what are the conditions under
which ideas may circulate like gifts? There is no sharp break in the gift-giving practices
described by Steinbeck (under the guise of either gossiping or material gifting) that
separates symbolic from material goods. Both may be mutually exchanged against one
another, both are predicated on securing a reasonable degree of trust between giver
and  receiver,  both  taboo  explicit  and  compulsory  reciprocation  (even  though
reciprocation is, in effect, compulsory), both generate the survival of the community as
a surplus-value: ideas, symbolic goods, and gossip may circulate like gifts if and only if
they are treated as such. 
24 We can hence rephrase Mauss’s synthetic question as a set of more explicitly political
and methodological ones: does scientific research entail obligations towards those from
whom we have received symbolic goods? Does receiving symbolic goods entail their
compulsory reciprocation? And if so, how can we ascertain that those symbolic goods
that  are  returned  as  symbolic  goods  will  not  be  excluded  from  the  “marketless”
economy they originate from? How can we ascertain that  our countergifts  will  not
destroy the marketless economy they originate from and are addressed to?
 
4. Taking From the Rich, Giving to the Poor: An Ethics
of Gossiping
It is strange that we do not yet have a logical theory of the duties of the reader, nor
a theory of the rights of the author.20
Novalis, Notes for a Romantic Encyclopedia
25 These questions are both rather technical and genuinely prosaic. I would like to suggest
that the ethical and epistemological dimensions of gossiping and gift-giving practices
can serve as general signposts for a possible literary theory that would take its role as a
participant  in  a  material  and  symbolic  economy  seriously.  Let  me  restate  the
fundamentals once more: Maussian trust implies that a symbolic good received (a word
or a novel, for instance) will elicit a countergift of an at least equal value, and that the
implicit social imaginary that supports this obligation must be preserved. In turn, the
survival  of  the  community  of  persons that  is  engaged  in  this  symbolic  exchange  is
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secured. Of course, the migrants in The Grapes of Wrath are fictional, so that the survival
of a novelistic life-world can only be taken to be metaphorical; however, it should be
the burden of the literary critic to demonstrate, if he or she is so inclined, that the
migrants  Steinbeck  wrote  about were  as  fictional  as  the  Joads,  that  the  Dust  Bowl
referred to  in  the  novel  is  not  the  Dust  Bowl  that  swept  across  the  American and
Canadian  prairies  during  the  1930s,  or  that  literary characters  may  never  refer  to
either  persons,  nor  citizens,  nor  people,  nor  humans  (after  all,  two  of  the  most
prominent literary theorists of the twentieth century, Paul de Man and Hans Robert
Jauß,  frequently  resorted  to  such  arguments,  partly  so  in  their  scholarly  works).
Alternatively, we may prefer to deduct binding interpretative norms, a “theory of the
duties of the reader” (Novalis 99), from the way Steinbeck construes symbolic exchange
as  a  matter  of  textual  interpretation (or  more  generally  as  a  mode of  writing  and
reading).  For instance,  we may declare ourselves accountable to the survival  of  the
persons Steinbeck’s novel is about. 
26 Yet the “aboutness” of literature (its conventional referentiality) is almost always the
occasion for ritualistic demonstrations of critical virtuosity: scholastic legitimacy is all
too often dependent on the devaluation of practical ends, the liquidation of historical
context, and, most importantly, the repudiation of the essentially conventional nature
of  linguistic  meaning in literature (conventionality as  distinct  from, yet  compatible
with,  arbitrariness:  “conventional”  because  users  agree  tacitly  or  explicitly  upon  a
lexical item’s meaning, such as “if,” or “bread,” or “hau”21). The scholastic lector “is
interested in texts,  and in theories,  methods and concepts that they convey, not in
order to do something with them, not to bring them, as useful, perfectible instruments,
into a practical use, but so as to gloss them, by relating them to other texts” (Bourdieu
2000, 62). It should not be so. By pointing out the relationship between Lévi-Strauss’s
grandiose  extension  of  market  paradigms  and  the  need  for  totalizations  in  the
capitalist  system,  we  can  arguably  dispense  with  such  theoretical  crutches  (and
political  fig  leaves)  as  the  “floating  signifier”  and replace  it  with  what,  in  Mauss’s
account, “hau” stands for22: the obligation to give gifts, to receive gifts, to return gifts,
to  return  gifts  of  an  at  least  equal  value,  to  ascertain  the  trustworthiness  of  the
recipient of one’s gift, to guarantee her anonymity so as to secure her protection and
survival, to let sufficient time between gift and countergift elapse so as to maintain the
fiction of generalized generosity, and finally to taboo both the compulsory nature of
countergifting  and  the  explicit  evaluation  of  a  gift’s  economic  value  (to  put  it
differently, gift and countergift must never be perceived as either debt or credit, even
when predicated on credo, or trust). The originary “empty” or “floating” signifier—Lévi-
Strauss’s  “hau”—turns  out  to  be  “too  full”  and  solidly  anchored  in  concrete  social
practices.
27 The crucial point for literary theory is the following: as a matter of principle, symbolic
and material goods are mutually giftable and countergiftable; our critical practice is a
symbolic practice that may be part of such a gifting circuit;  consequently, one may
never  assume  a  break  between  symbolic  practices  and  their  material  referents,
although such a break may occur.
28 Let me elucidate this claim from another angle. Gifting and the survival of the gifting
community are predicated on trust; trust, in turn, is predicated on a) the obligation to
foster the community through putatively disinterested gifting and b) the careful, yet
always  tacit  assessment  of  the  giftee’s  ability  to  receive  and  return  a  gift.  This
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assessment can be described as a set of questions. Will the person to whom I give a
commodity or symbolic good be able to accept this gift as a gift, and hence to return a
gift of an at least equal value? Will the giftee be rich enough to fulfill the obligation of
reciprocation and, in turn, become a countergifter? I suggest that such wagers are at
the core of literary interpretation. It is precisely because I cannot be certain that the
intended  meaning  will  match  the  meaning  received  that  I  have  to  trust  the
conventional nature of linguistic meaning and, just as importantly, consider the socio-
economic  and  linguistic  situation  of  those  I  communicate  with—be  it  in  academic
criticism, in the Pacific Islands, or in the diegetic world of The Grapes of Wrath. Every
exchange of symbolic goods (gossip, literature, an utterance, its meaning) is predicated
on the tacit, probabilistic, and materialist assessment that it will be understood in such
a  way  that  its  reception  will  not  damage  the  possibility  of  communication  itself
(including its return as a countergift), nor its corollary, the survival of the community
of those who participate in literary communication––professional and non-professional
readers alike. Reading literary discourse “against the grain,” in other words, is not a
“negotiation”23 (or a creative-destructive “business”) with the pitfalls of language itself,
although it is often couched in such terms, but rather a “negotiation” with (or more
simply a negation of) the fact that the reception and production of literary meaning are
socially constituted acts.
29 The problem, of course, becomes urgent when we consider that a significant portion of
canonical literature of the nineteenth and twentieth century (The Grapes of Wrath, The
American,  practically  all  of  Faulkner,  practically  all  of  Woolf,  practically  all  of  the
African-American canon) stages the unequal distribution of linguistic resources among
writers,  diegetic  characters,  readers,  and  socio-historical  referents,  and  that  this
unequal distribution is often illustrated by the use of informal discourse. The more
unequal  the  distribution  of  linguistic  resources  (including  the  distribution  of
“background assumptions” we call into play in order to assess conventional meaning
[Searle  80])  among  readers,  diegetic  characters,  authors,  and  referents,  the  more
uncertain and riskier the exchange and interpretation of literary discourse becomes:
the likelihood of producing an adequate reading (on which even the most disheveled
“misreading” always remains woefully dependent), that is, the likelihood of receiving a
meaning approximately as it was intended, is predicated on the approximate adequation,
or  alternatively  correct appreciation,  of  all  linguistic,  political,  socio-economic
resources involved.24 In Maussian terms, it is riskier to give to the poor, and riskier for
a critic to speak to (and read) those who do not hold a doctorate, yet only as long as one
holds  on  to  the  idea  that  linguistic  meaning  is  conventional  precisely  because  its
conventionality  fulfills  a  social  function,  that  is,  that  the  conventional  nature  of
language  is  in  itself  meaningful  socially.  From  the  moment  this  conventionality  is
negated, literary theory gains one of the prime justifications for the quasi-industrial
production  of  commentary;  by  the  same  token,  however,  it  loses  both  its
trustworthiness  and  truthfulness  as  a  social  and  political  act.  Our  own  “critical
investments  in  literature”  (to  use  another  typical  and  symptomatic  phrase  of  our
current jargon) are contingent on our belief in our ability to receive and reciprocate
symbolic goods. Still,  such wagers are made, and they are made every time literary
discourse is read in the hope of understanding its conventional meaning, and every
time literary discourse is written in the hope of being understood conventionally. 
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NOTES
1. For a discussion of the authoritarian history of liberalism, see: Chamayou. 
2. Bruno  Amable  and  Stefano  Palombarini,  among  many  others,  have  noted  the
importance  of  these  Schumpeterian  themes  for  the  current  formation  of
entrepreneurship and intellectuality alike, as well as for the way both envision social
change (Amable, Palombarini, 161-187). 
3. First published as Essai sur le don in L’Année sociologique in 1925.
4. First published as Introduction à l’Œuvre de Marcel Mauss in 1950. 
5. The political writings of Marcel Mauss shed light on the relationship between the
development of  The Gift,  the Russian Revolution,  the rise  of  Fascism,  and the great
hopes Mauss laid in democratic, humanist socialism (Mauss, Écrits politiques 249-721).
6. This  is,  of  course,  also  a  feature  of  credit  transactions  in  general.  Simmel  is
particularly interesting on this subject in: Simmel 484-486.
7. In the context of his theory of practice, Pierre Bourdieu’s reading of Mauss presents
a nearly exhaustive account of these epistemological problems (Bourdieu, The Logic of
Practice 98-111).
8. Sahlins explains his translation of hau as “yield”; 139-150.
9. Becker discusses altruistic behavior as rational behavior; 282-294.
10. Godbout has discussed much more complex prisoner dilemmas with respect to the
anthropology  of  gift-giving.  I  here  use  a  simpler  model  in  order  to  highlight  the
paradoxes of Lévi-Strauss’s reading of The Gift; Godbout 286-299.
11. So much so, in fact, that the prohibition of cartels, whose formation would be a
rational response to such a situation, has to be devolved to other, non-economic social
institutions (legal frameworks, for instance). 
12. See Hofstadter’s classic essay; 737-755.
13. Generally, see: Hirschman.
14. See also, more generally: Wiener 155-160. 
15. Maussian scholarship frequently insists on the coexistence of market economics
and gift-giving practices in the societies it  studies,  including Western hypermodern
societies. Generally, see: Weber 34-38, 54. 
16. For instance:  “I  knowed a fella  from California.  He didn’t  talk like us.  You’d of
knowed he come from some far-off place jus’ the way he talked. But he says they’s too
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many folks lookin’ for work right there now. An’ he says the folks that pick the fruit
live in dirty ol’ camps an’ don’t hardly get enough to eat” (Steinbeck 306). 
17. “If  a body’s every took charity,  it  makes a burn that don’t come out.  This ain’t
charity, but if you ever took it, you don’t forget it” (Steinbeck 547). 
18. In general, literature on gossiping as a form of gifting is scarce and dated. Niko
Besnier  very  briefly  mentions  Maussian  gifting  as  a  possible  analytic  paradigm  of
gossiping,  and  Bailey  first  pointed  out  the  relation  between  the  micropolitics  of
reputation and gift-giving practices (Besnier 118-119; Bailey). 
19. The ethical, economic, and religious mutations of the Latin credo have long been
noted by linguists (Benveniste 138-142).
20. My translation. David W. Wood’s otherwise excellent translation of Novalis’s Notes
for a Romantic Encyclopedia is somewhat unclear in this specific instance (Novalis 99).
21. Generally,  see  Davidson’s  discussion  of  conventional  and  literal  meaning  in:
Davidson 157-174.
22. Generally, for Lévi-Strauss’s interpretation of “hau” as a “floating signifier” see:
Schrift 1-22.
23. A symptomatic phrase in the critical jargon: we “negotiate,” from the Latin “neg-
otium”:  “not-contemplation”  and  “not-philosophy;”  we  “do  business”  with  texts
instead. Incidentally, the earliest philological journal in the United States, published by
the  American Philological  Association from 1869  onwards,  was  entitled  Transactions
(Turner 278-279).
24. As early as 1984, Jacques Bouveresse showed how constitutive this rejection of the
conventionality  of  literary  and  philosophical  language  had  been  for  the  ascent  of
theorists like Derrida, Deleuze, and Foucault (Bouveresse 120-133).
ABSTRACTS
This essay discusses gift-giving and gossiping in a canonical American novel (John Steinbeck’s
The Grapes of Wrath,  1939) by way of the two texts which sealed the fate of dominant literary
scholarship after WWII: Marcel Mauss’s essay The Gift and Claude Lévi-Strauss’s Introduction to the
Work of Marcel Mauss. Steinbeck’s use of informal discourse and Marcel Mauss’s descriptions of
tacit  compulsory  reciprocation  present  the  opportunity  to  dispute  central  assumptions  in
literary theory that pertain to literary meaning, interpretation, and referentiality.  This essay
argues that literary language is conventional precisely because its conventionality fulfills a social
function; the conventional nature of literary language is in itself meaningful socially. This, in
turn,  suggests  that  the  interpretation  of  literary  texts  remains  dependent  on  a  correct
understanding of the material and symbolic economies they participate in. 
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